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Different quantities that go by the name of entropy are used in variational principles to infer prob-
ability distributions from limited data. Shore and Johnson showed that maximizing the Boltzmann-
Gibbs form of the entropy ensures that probability distributions inferred satisfy the multiplication
rule of probability for independent events in the absence of data coupling such events. Other types
of entropies that violate the Shore and Johnson axioms, including nonadditive entropies such as the
Tsallis entropy, violate this basic consistency requirement. Here we use the axiomatic framework of
Shore and Johnson to show how such nonadditive entropy functions generate biases in probability
distributions that are not warranted by the underlying data.
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A problem of broad interest across the sciences is to infer the mathematical form of a probability distribution given
limited data [1]. For instance, we may be given limited information on an equilibrium system –say its average energy–
from which we must predict the mathematical form of the full energy probability distribution. In this classic example,
the distribution used in statistical mechanics is the exponential Boltzmann distribution.
In many cases –including the case above– limited data is consistent with many possible models for a probability
distribution. How should we select the “best” model that fits the data? By model, we mean a set of probablities, {pk},
for the outcomes k of an experiment. One way to select the model is to eliminate candidate models by supplementing
the data with additional assumptions [2–6]. A common additional assumption is based on choosing the model that
has the largest entropy. This is basis for the variational principle called Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) [7].
The MaxEnt approach has its historical roots in the work of Boltzmann in equilibrium statistical physics. Later,
Shannon and Jaynes showed that picking the model with the largest entropy was analogous to maximizing the uncer-
tainty, H , of the model [7–10]. In particular, Jaynes drew the connection between statistical mechanics and Shannon’s
work on information theory by showing that since Shannon’s H = −
∑
pk log pk coincides with the Boltzmann-Gibbs
(BG) entropy, statistical mechanics could be treated as an inference problem [9, 10]. Shannon and Jaynes and others
justified the specific mathematical form, H = −
∑
pk log pk on the basis of abstract properties of H itself, such as
satisfying a composition property [7]. Others justified the form for H using the Khinchin axioms [11, 12] or the
Fadeev postulates [13], for example.
By contrast to these methods for deriving H on the basis of H ’s properties, Shore and Johnson (SJ) [14] showed that
MaxEnt was the only consistent recipe for drawing self-consistent inferences from data. SJ only asserted, by means
of four axioms, that any variational procedure must yield a unique probability distribution that satisfies the rules of
addition and multiplication for independent probabilities if data does not couple the probabilities for different events.
The arguments of SJ are quite general as they do not assign explicit meaning –and, in particular, any thermodynamic
meaning– to H itself. Thus H can be used as a variational function to discriminate between models across a broad
range of problems.
However in recent years, other mathematical functions of {pk} also called entropies [12, 13, 15–21] –and, more
broadly, regularization schemes [22] of which entropy maximization is a special type– have been used to infer complex
2models, often power laws, from data. In general, these entropies violate one or more of SJ’s axioms and, as a result,
may be nonadditive. By contrast, the BG entropy is additive in the sense that for two independent systems A and
B, the value of the BG entropy H for the combined system satisfies H(A,B) = H(A) +H(B).
Nonadditive entropies have been of particular interest because they are commonly invoked when microscopic com-
ponents of a system have long-range interactions. These unconventional entropies satisfy different properties from
those of BG. As an example, according to Tsallis, Gell-Mann and Sato [23], the Tsallis entropy [12, 16, 18, 23? ] of
a scale-invariant system is extensive. While nonadditive entropies do not satisfy the additivity rule, they may instead
satisfy a “pseudo-additivity rule” [24], H(A,B) = H(A)+H(B)+ ǫH(A)H(B), where ǫ is a measure of the deviation
from additivity. Nonadditive forms of the entropy function used within variational principles can preferentially select
models having power law distributions [18, 25] which arise from a variety of natural and social systems.
Nonadditive entropies have been criticized on the basis, for example, that the Tsallis parameter q [26, 27] (related
to the ǫ presented earlier) is often chosen by fitting data, rather than by some first principle [25]. Furthermore,
unconventional averages must often be used to constrain nonadditive entropies [28–33] to assure the convexity of
those functions if they are to be used to infer a unique model.
In regard to these criticisms, if the matter at hand concerns situations in which a full distribution of data is already
known –and thus q could be fit to data– then it is fair to ask whether there is a need for any variational principle
for selecting a model in the first place. This raises the question of how to justify –and when to use– BG versus
nonadditive entropies.
The question of interest here is how nonadditive entropies can be justified within SJ’s axiomatic framework. This
framework is not about specifying properties of H based on physical (and often thermodynamic) properties of an
entropy but rather about making self-consistent inferences from data without imposing structure on a model which
is not warranted by the data itself. Thus SJ’s axioms are stronger conditions than additivity conditions on H .
We use SJ’s reasoning to shed light on what variant of the basic logical consistency requirements are necessary to
derive an alternate formula for the entropy. We first review SJ’s axioms and show how BG’s H follows from the the
product rule, pij = uivj in the absence of data coupling events i and j. We will then show what rules of probability
would be required instead in order to justify the Tsallis entropy as well as other entropies. In particular, we will show
from SJ that the Tsallis entropy can only be justified if events i and j were to have the following joint probability
pq−1ij =
(
uq−1i + v
q−1
j − 1
)
–presupposed in the absence of data coupling events i and j– rather than pij = uivj .
The Shore and Johnson Axioms – SJ considered the problem of extracting a model from data using a variational
function H({pk}). The model, {p
∗
k}, is the one that gives the maximum of
H({pk})− λ
(∑
k
pkak − a¯
)
(1)
with respect to {pk} and the Lagrange multiplier λ. See Ref.[30–33] for a discussion of constraints. Here the data is
imposed as a constraint on the quantity a, where a¯ is the measured average. For simplicity, we considered here only
a single equality constraint.
SJ gave four axioms that must be satisfied by the maximum of the function given by Eq. (1) on the basis of requiring
that any inference drawn from this function be self-consistent. These four axioms determine the form of H .
1) Uniqueness – says that the function H({pk}) must be convex, so that there will only be a single maximum,
i.e. a single set of values, {p∗k}.
2) Coordinate system invariance – says that predictions made from an inference should be independent of
the choice of coordinate system. It is relevant when the probabilities are continuous functions and determining the
dependence of H on the prior over pi.
3) Subset independence – says that if probability, pk, of bin k increases by δp and the probability pj of bin
j correspondingly decreases by δp, then no other bins are affected by the change. Subset independence yields the
relationship,
H =
∑
k
f(pk) + C, (2)
3where C is a constant independent of pk.
4) System independence – says that bringing together two systems having probabilities u = {ui} and v = {vj}
gives new bins that have probability p = u×v where pij = uivj . The systems are considered independent if constraints
on the data do not couple them. Consider a combined system with two decoupled constraints, one on ui (which is∑
i,j pijai − a¯ =
∑
i uiai − a¯ = 0) and another on vj (which is
∑
i,j pij − b¯ =
∑
j vjbj − b¯ = 0).
The maximum of
H(p)− λa

∑
i,j
pijai − a¯

− λb

∑
i,j
pijbj − b¯

 (3)
with respect to pij = uivj satisfies
f ′(pij)− λaai − λbbj = 0. (4)
Taking two derivatives of the above (one with respect to ui and another with respect to vj) yields
f ′′(pij) + pijf
′′′(pij) = 0. (5)
We define f ′′(pα) ≡ g(pα), where α ≡ (i, j). Then Eq. (5) reduces to g(pα) + pαg
′(pα) = 0. The solution is
g(pα) = −1/pα. It follows that f(pα) = −pα log pα + pα and H = −
∑
α pα log pα +C, where all additional constants
have been absorbed into C.
The derivation above shows how the BG formula follows from the axioms of SJ. Intuitively, SJ’s axioms 3 and 4 take
as definitions the fact that events are independent unless the data couples them and the probabilities for independent
events satisfy the usual rules of addition and multiplication for such probabilities. This explains why the BG entropy
is additive.
However, not all physical systems are additive; often cited as counterexamples are systems having long-ranged
interactions [18]. The question is how should nonadditivity be built into a model? One route has been to redefine
entropy and replace it with a form which violates axiom 4, system independence – the law of multiplication of
probability for independent events, pk = uivj . Here we demonstrate the logical consequences that follow from
redefining the entropy.
The Tsallis entropy is defined as
H =
K
1− q
(∑
k
pqk − 1
)
. (6)
This expression satisfies subset independence, axiom 3, but does not satisfy system independence, axiom 4. What
functional form for pij = p(ui, vj) yields the Tsallis entropy? To answer this question, we repeat steps analogous
to those in Eqns. (3)-(5) except now we treat pij as a general function of ui and vj and f(pij) is given by the form
Eq. (6). This gives
(2− q)−1pij
∂2pij
∂ui∂vj
=
∂pij
∂ui
∂pij
∂vj
. (7)
Eq. (7) is a differential equation satisfied by the joint probability in the Tsallis entropy. As a check, we can see that
for q = 1 –when the Tsallis entropy reduces to the BG entropy– the expression is exactly satisfied for pij = uivj , as
expected. The constant (2− q)−1 in Eq. (7) describes the deviation from independence (often one speaks of deviation
from independence in terms of the q-additivity of the Tsallis entropy –as opposed to normal additivity of entropy in
statistical mechanics [19, 21, 24].).
We now solve Eq. (7).
Step 1 – Substitute pij = h
x
ij –where x is a number– into Eq. (7). After some algebraic rearrangement, this yields
− (2− q)−1xhij
∂2hij
∂ui∂vj
=
(
x(x − 1)(2− q)−1 − x2
) ∂hij
∂ui
∂hij
∂vj
(8)
4We select x such that
(
x(x − 1)(2− q)−1 − x2
)
= 0. The non-trivial solution to this quadratic equation is x = 1/(q−1)
(the trivial solution is x = 0). Plugging x = 1/(q − 1) into Eq. (8), we have
∂2hij
∂ui∂vj
= 0. (9)
Eq. (9) is solved by hij = φ1(ui) + φ2(vj) with φ1 and φ2 yet to be determined. Since both pij and hij must be
symmetric functions of ui and vj , then φ1 = φ2 ≡ φ. We therefore have
pq−1ij = hij = φ(ui) + φ(vj) (10)
Step 2 – In order to determine the function φ(x), we rewrite it is as
φ(x) = g(x)q−1 − 1/2 (11)
without loss of generality, so that Eq(10) takes the form
pij =
(
g(ui)
q−1 + g(vj)
q−1 − 1
)1/(q−1)
. (12)
The leading order expansion of (12) in q − 1 is
pij = g(ui)g(vj)− (q − 1)g(ui)g(vj) log g(ui) log g(vj) +O((q − 1)
2). (13)
and from the condition that the composition rule reduces to the product rule in the limit of q → 1, we get g(x) = x.
Substituting it back into Eq.(12), we get
pij =
(
uq−1i + v
q−1
j − 1
)1/(q−1)
. (14)
Eq.(14) can also be written in terms of the q-product defined by Tsallis[18]. Furthermore, Eq. (7) gives us the choice to
select a multiplicative constant that can be determined by normalization of the joint probability, pij . Fundamentally,
the spurious correlations between events –which consist of all terms beyond the first term in Eq. 13– emerge because
the Tsallis entropy violates SJ’s axiom 4. This axiom specifically requires that in the absence of couplings between
events i and j, the model inferred using the BG entropy should satisfy the normal rules of multiplication of probability
(pij = uivj).
Many entropies –beyond the Tsallis entropy– also violate axiom 4. These entropies therefore generate spurious
correlations not warranted by the data even if they are additive in the sense H({pij}) = H({ui})+H({vj}). In other
words, axiom 4 is a stronger statement than is the statement that H ’s add.
For instance, consider the Burg entropy[34] K
∑
k log pk which is additive in the sense described above. The Burg
entropy satisfies SJ’s axiom 3 but violates axiom 4. For this entropy, the system dependence relationship still deviates
from the rule of multiplication of probability for independent events
p−1ij = u
−1
i + v
−1
j − 1. (15)
Eqns. (14) and (15) underscore the profound consequences that result from altering the form of the entropy used
in model inference. SJ’s axioms assure us that the BG form of the entropy enforces a model distribution which is
as featureless as possible. According to SJ’s framework, couplings between events –or more broadly, structure in a
model– arises in one of two ways. Either the couplings in the data explicitly give rise to correlations between events i
and j or the prior over the {pk} –the set {qk} which can be thought of as a hyperprior– gives rise to structure beyond
what is present in the data. Thus application of the BG entropy ensures that inferences do not go beyond what is in
the data or {qk}.
However non-traditional entropies, which violate SJ’s axiom 4, are inconsistent with the probability relationship
pij = uivj even in the absence of any evidence of coupling between events i and j. While entropy priors –such as the
Tsallis entropy– can readily infer power law distributions for {pk}, they impose structure in a model that goes beyond
what is known from the data. Here Eqns. (14) and (15) derive this additional structure imposed by these entropies
on a model explicitly. We conclude by adding that it is possible to infer power laws within a principle of maximizing
5the BG entropy by constraining just one average: Mandelbrot [35] showed this by invoking logarithmic constraints,
〈log k〉.
In summary, the maximization of entropy is a variational prescription for selecting one of many possible models
of probability distributions consistent with limited data. In a seminal result that we review here, SJ showed that
only the BG entropy or functions with identical maxima ensure that models derived from them satisfy basic logical
self-consistency requirements. We apply SJ’s approach to derive what joint probability for states of two systems
would be required to justify the form of the Tsallis entropy as well as other entropies in selecting model probability
distributions consistent with data. We observe that all forms of nonadditive entropy functions require probability rules
other than the multiplication rule even when events are independent according to data. We conclude that for modeling
nonexponential distributions, such as power laws, nonextensivity should be expressed through the constraints or the
q’s, not the entropy. Said differently, no structure should be assumed in a distribution function unless it is observed
as coupling in the data or originates from the prior distribution on {pk}.
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